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Abstract 
 
Hume’s contribution to modern economics is normally thought of in terms of his early 
statement of the quantity theory of money, and to a lesser extent his views on trade and 
development. At a methodological level the influence from his empiricism is commonly 
traced to the development of econometrics. But if we explore his philosophy more fully, 
we find a much richer set of ideas which can illuminate the way we approach issues in 
modern economics. Here therefore we explore Hume’s theory of human nature and his 
theory of knowledge in order to understand how he viewed economic behaviour as 
inherently bound up in other aspects of life. From this follows a perspective on the 
relations between economics and other disciplines (notably history, sociology and 
psychology) which may inform current explorations of these relations. This reading of 
Hume’s approach to economics is illustrated by revisiting his theories of money and 
growth, and his approach to empiricism. Hume holds the potential for a much richer 
contribution to modern economics than is normally understood. 
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Introduction 
Modern economics focuses on a range of questions. Of these, one of the more important 
at the micro level is how to develop a fuller account of behaviour than the traditional 
account of rational economic man. At particular issue is how far what is required is a 
more sophisticated notion of rationality, and how far the scope for a rational account of 
behaviour is limited. Further, should economics draw more on other disciplines in order 
to understand behaviour more fully?  
 
At the macro level there is a concern to understand differences in economic performance 
between countries when the traditional account had predicted convergence. There is also 
concern to predict the outcome of the emergence of different modes of organisation, 
notably state capitalism. Here there is an increasing interest in culture and institutions as 
underpinning differences in performance, again opening up further potential for input 
from other disciplines. Some of these differences have persisted between market 
economies in spite of globalisation. So what is to be expected from persistent differences 
between market economies and the new state-sponsored capitalist economies? And how 
far can conventions and institutions themselves be understood as being the outcome of 
rational choice? 
 
Both of these developments have encouraged dialogue with other disciplines, such as 
psychology and sociology, which have traditionally been thought of as separate from 
economics. These developments have also posed more general methodological questions 
about how we should build, and appraise, knowledge in economics, and thus a renewed 
interest in philosophy. Indeed there is greater awareness of the uncertainty with which 
knowledge is held, both by individual agents, but also by policy-makers and economists. 
There is also increasing awareness of the role of institutions, and more widely of habits 
and conventions, for individual behaviour and for the economy as a whole. Which 
methodological approach would best embrace this awareness? In particular, questions 
have been posed about the scope for abstract formal modelling as the exclusive method 
for addressing these developments. 
 
In considering the role for input from philosophy, there is the potential to learn by 
looking back, before the emergence of this trend for economics to be defined by its 
formalist method, to a train of thought stemming from the Enlightenment period. The 
specific purpose here is to consider the work of David Hume for its relevance to modern 
economics. David Hume was a great philosopher and historian during the Enlightenment 
period when the discipline of modern economics saw its beginnings.1 He is particularly 
associated with the emergence of modern economics through his friendship with, and 
influence on, his fellow Scot, Adam Smith. As such he merits particular attention when 
considering the influence of philosophy on modern economics. 
 
But Hume is probably more widely recognised for his direct contributions to economics, 
in a series of essays (Hume 1752) which are cited as the inspiration for modern theories 
in the areas of money, international trade and growth. Thus for example Friedman (1975) 
                                                 
1
 Economics of course has a much longer history. But it is widely accepted that modern economics took 
much of its character from this period (see eg Gordon 1991, Screpanti and Zemagni 1993). 
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discusses modern monetarism in terms of a ‘rediscovery’ of ideas stemming from Hume. 
Frenkel and Johnson (1976) repeatedly cite his theory of money and trade (notably the 
role of the price-specie-flow mechanism) as an original expression of a key element of 
global monetarism. Rostow (   ) cites Hume as the first in the development of theories of 
economic growth, through free trade and the money flows associated with trade. North?  
 
Hume is also known in economics for his philosophy of science, as an empiricist who 
inspired the subsequent development of positivism. While this influence arguably has 
indeed been great, much of the literature on Hume’s philosophy itself suggests that it is 
based on a misinterpretation of Hume’s philosophy. Indeed some key figures in 
economics, such as Keynes and Hayek, have interpreted Hume’s philosophy quite 
differently, and have thus drawn on his influence to develop economics using 
methodological approaches very different to positivism. Further, by considering Hume’s 
economics in terms of his philosophy, the ‘quantity theorist’ interpretation of Hume has 
also been questioned. 
 
In discussing Hume’s relevance for modern economics here, the case will be made for a 
particular interpretation of Hume’s philosophy and economics. Inevitably we look back at 
Hume through the spectacles of the twenty-first century. All anyone can offer is 
interpretation from this or that perspective. The best we can do therefore, in trying to 
understand Hume, is to try to understand his own perspective.2 We therefore begin with a 
brief account of this context. In the third section an account of Hume’s philosophy and 
economics is set out, followed by a discussion of the different interpretations 
subsequently applied. We conclude by considering the potential for Hume’s philosophy 
to inform modern economics, including a reflection on how economics can and should 
relate to other disciplines. 
 
Hume in his Context 
Hume has often been treated, along with Smith, as a major figure within a broad, 
European Enlightenment. Indeed he lived for considerable periods of his life in France, 
and was influenced by the various currents of enlightenment philosophy on the continent. 
However, more recent scholarship has built up a picture of the Scottish Enlightenment as 
having a particular character, distinguishing it from the Enlightenment elsewhere (Allan 
1993, Broadie 1989, 2003a).3 Indeed we will find that it is crucial, for the interpretation 
of Hume, which Enlightenment approach is employed. We therefore need to consider 
Hume’s background in Scotland, and the origins of the Scottish Enlightenment in order 
fully to understand his philosophy, and his economics as applications of his moral 
philosophy.  
 
                                                 
2Our approach here is therefore in line with the historiographical approach most associated with Quentin 
Skinner (1969), and most prevalent in the modern literature on the history of economic thought. 
Accordingly it is therefore judged to be important for our understanding of Hume to have some 
understanding of the context in which he was writing and his motivation. See further Dow (2001). 
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 Norman Kemp Smith (1905a, 1905b, 1928, 1941) had been an early lone voice maintaining this 
argument. 
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Scotland’s prior political history was as an independent nation, often with continental 
European alliances and in conflict with England, until the Union of the Crowns in 1603 
and the union of the parliaments in 1707. But the move to England, first of the court and 
then the parliament, brought to the fore questions of jurisdiction and authority, and the 
associated questions of virtue, and the relationship between church and state, which set 
the agenda for Scottish moral philosophy in the eighteenth century, out of which grew 
what we would now recognise as the social sciences. At the same time, Scotland was a 
poor country relative to its richer neighbour, England. Encouraging analysis of 
differences in economic performance.4 Further, Scotland was undergoing significant 
change with the emerging commercialisation of economic activity, and facing such 
practical questions as those concerning agricultural improvement, trade policy and the 
emergence of banking. The protestant church had encouraged widespread literacy (at 
least in terms of reading ability), and education adopted a historical approach to subjects 
which served a problem-oriented search for knowledge which drew on whichever 
approach best addressed the problem (rather than some notion of the demonstrably ‘best’ 
or ‘true’ approach more typical of the Oxford approach to education; see Davie 1961, 
1986). Arguably, the inevitable continuing awareness in a small nation of alternative 
approaches to knowledge and organisation in other countries further fostered a somewhat 
sceptical approach to knowledge (ie scepticism that one approach from outside could be 
imposed on Scotland as being demonstrably superior).  
 
There was a long tradition in Scottish philosophy which presaged the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Common sense philosophy encouraged the idea that the mind was able to 
generate ideas over and above the experience of the individual senses.5 Evidence, or 
experience, is mediated through the mind. Another tradition, of natural law philosophy, 
encouraged the idea that there was some natural order to physical reality. As society 
underwent the changes associated with commercialisation, population movements into 
urban areas and political change, the application of natural law to society was a natural 
development in Scottish philosophy, putting the focus on human nature. Much of Scottish 
moral philosophy therefore was devoted to building up a science of man.6  
 
The character of the Scottish Enlightenment was distinct from the French and English 
Enlightenments.7 The former, exemplified by Descartes, was rationalist, in the sense that 
reason, employed in deductive logic, was given primacy, and was sufficient for 
demonstrating the truth of arguments. The latter, exemplified by Bacon, was empiricist, 
giving primacy to observation and inductive logic. While Bacon did influence Scottish 
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 This was expressed in the ‘rich country – poor country debate’ (Hont 1983, 2008). 
5
 Thomas Reid, the leader of the school of common sense philosophy, was a noted critic of Hume. But, as 
Sutherland (1982) argues, their common background meant that their philosophies had much in common. 
6
 Questions about social order and human nature had pressing importance, not only at a time of the 
engagement of Scots with the New World and its indigenous people, but also closer to home at a time when 
questions of ‘civilising’ Scottish Highlanders was a matter of public policy and debate. Following the 
second Rebellion in 1745 there was a policy of suppression of Highland culture, as well as economic 
improvement of the Highlands, although the 1715 and 1745 Rebellions and their putting-down did not 
strictly follow Highland-Lowland lines. 
7
 Inevitably, any national characterisation of enlightenment involves simplification; nevertheless, in broad 
terms, there were significant national differences. 
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thought, it was the particular Scottish interpretation of Newton’s experimental philosophy 
(highlighting the emphasis on forming theoretical principles on the basis of observation, 
and then checked against further observation) which was more representative of Scottish 
philosophy of science (see Montes 2006, Cremaschi 2008).  
 
While Hume’s intellectual and experiential background were Scottish,8 the initial 
development of his own philosophical contributions occurred when he was in France, 
where he wrote the Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 1739-40); this work can be 
interpreted as his early grappling with the rationalism of the French Enlightenment. He 
sought to establish how far reason could take us in establishing a theory of human nature. 
Given his conclusion that reason was inadequate for the purpose, the Scottish character of 
Hume’s philosophy developed as he turned to seek an alternative approach to moral 
philosophy which would provide a foundation for practical reason. He further developed 
this approach in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1748) and then 
in his subsequent essays (Hume 1752) as he increasingly addressed practical questions, 
including his essays on economic subjects (Rotwein 1955). He also became a noted 
historian, with publication of his History of England. Indeed Hume adopted the Scottish 
historical approach more generally to all his work, in addressing practical questions as 
well as questions at a philosophical level, drawing particularly on examples from ancient 
history. In summary, it was the need to provide a philosophical foundation for new 
developments in scientific knowledge applied to society as well as the physical world 
which shaped the character of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. 
 
David Hume’s Philosophy  
Hume’s philosophy is the subject of an enormous, and complex, literature. The aim here 
is to provide an account which gives sufficient flavour of Hume’s philosophy to indicate 
the rich seam available to economists. In the spirit of the French Enlightenment, Hume 
had set out to explore how far reason could take a theory of human nature. But his 
conclusion was that it was impossible to establish general principles which could be 
demonstrated to be true purely on the basis of reason. He puts this most clearly in the 
Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature, where he suggests that ‘any hypothesis, 
that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to 
be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’ (Hume 1739-40: xvii). Reason alone could 
not establish existence of reality, without which foundation knowledge in the natural or 
moral sciences was impossible. Even in mathematics, such concepts as equality could 
only derive meaning from experience (Hume 1740: 26-7).He argued that this scepticism 
about the scope of reason should apply to all knowledge, whether scientific or everyday 
knowledge, which instead must rely on ‘experience’ (ie evidence) and ‘authority’ (ie 
conventional knowledge): 
 
                                                 
8
 David Hume absorbed much of the Scottish philosophical background as a student at the University of 
Edinburgh in the 1730s, although the greater influence was Frances Hutcheson, Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Hutcheson was identified by Scott (1900: 265) as the ’prototype 
of the Scottish Enlightenment’; it was Scott himself who first coined that expression. 
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 [w]hen we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit 
down contented; … But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles 
should be deemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that ‘tis 
a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can 
employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the 
philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of them go 
beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that 
authority. 
(ibid.: xviii) 
 
Hume follows Newton in discussing evidence in terms of ‘experiments’; indeed the 
subtitle of the Treatise is ‘Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. He draws the distinction between the constructed 
experiments of the natural sciences and the observation of natural instances in moral 
philosophy (encompassing what we would now call the social sciences), as the source of 
‘experience’. In the latter case, constructed experiments would be unreliable because they 
would ‘disturb the operation of my natural principles’ (ibid: xix). Rather experiments in 
moral philosophy should draw on  
 
a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common 
course of the world. … Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected 
and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be 
inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human 
comprehension. 
         (ibid.) 
 
For Hume, history provided a vast array of accounts of human life, from which 
provisional principles might be drawn. Hume also noted the role of introspection in 
providing a distinctive source of evidence for the theory of human nature, and indeed he 
is identified as influential in the subsequent emergence of the science of the mind 
(Loasby 2008). However, he regarded third party observation as being more reliable, 
since the mind alters what it tries to recall through introspection (Broadie 2003b). 
 
But observation too was inadequate for establishing the truth of general principles, given 
the complexity of the subject matter and the difficulty in identifying underlying causal 
mechanisms from the observation of constant conjunctions of events. It was not that there 
was no order (in nature or society) – indeed belief that there was order was necessary for 
science. Rather for Hume the problem of induction was that we could never be certain of 
having identified underlying causal mechanisms. All we had to go on was observation of 
the effects of causal mechanisms, and the idea of causation (derived from experience, 
mediated by the mind); we do not have direct access to the mechanisms themselves. 
Using the example of anatomy, Hume explains the hidden nature of the deep structural 
causal forces connecting volition and movement: 
 
. . . the immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the 
member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and 
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animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more 
unknown, through which the motion is successively propagated, ere it 
reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of 
volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this 
whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known 
by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree, 
mysterious and unintelligible?   
(Hume 1748, VII.I.52, 66) 
  
How then are we to regard knowledge in the absence of demonstration of truth through 
either deductive or inductive logic? In an earlier passage in the Introduction, Hume had 
argued that the science of human nature was primary: ‘’Tis evident that all the sciences 
have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; … since they lie under the cognizance of 
men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties’ (ibid.: xv). It was through 
understanding these faculties that we could understand the nature of, and scope for, 
knowledge. In addition to the faculty of reason, men crucially have the faculty of 
imagination. It is imagination which allows us to generate ideas – even the idea of 
causation itself. More specifically, it is imagination which allows us to infer (provisional) 
general principles from experience; this includes the principle of existence, which we 
infer from habitual belief built up in society from generations of experience. ‘We may 
well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But ‘tis vain to ask, 
Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our 
reasonings’ (Hume 1739-40, I.IV.II: 187, emphasis in original).  
 
Imagination allows us to identify some order in experience. By intuiting similarities we 
may apply reasoning from one instance to another by analogy.  
 
All kinds of reasoning from causes or effects are founded on two particulars, viz. 
the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and the 
resemblance of a present object to any one of them. Without some degree of 
resemblance, as well as union, ‘tis impossible there can be any reasoning. 
(ibid. I.III.XII: 142)9 
 
Since such reasoning is conjectural, or constitutes ‘belief’, it can be challenged, on the 
basis of experience – Hume notably challenged the certainties of religious belief, and 
‘superstition’ more generally. Indeed, since belief is based on past experience, and this 
does not constitute proof, conventional belief may be misguided (Hume 1740). But as the 
only reasonable basis for human behaviour, beliefs form part of the subject matter of the 
science of man, and thus the role of the imagination is central. Adam Smith notably 
developed this notion of the faculty of imagination in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
where sympathy formed the basis for the social nature of human behaviour.10  
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 Hume (1748, IV.II.31, 36) famously used the example of eggs, each of which is unique, but recognisable 
as bearing a fundamental resemblance to other eggs. 
10
 Both Hume and Smith, recognising that true knowledge was not available in everyday life, as in science, 
and thus the importance of the faculty of imagination, emphasised the resulting scope for fiction and self-
deception. For Hume fictions could have a positive social role, as in the case of money, where metallic 
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Indeed we see in Hume’s Introduction, as quoted above, further indication of the role he 
gave what we now know as psychology in his philosophy of science (something again 
which Adam Smith developed, in his Essay on the History of Astronomy). He refers to 
‘contentment’ with the outcome of enquiry, rather than ‘truth’, and his role in persuading 
his readers. ‘There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of 
learning are not of contrary opinions. … amidst all this bustle ‘tis not reason, which 
carries the prize, but eloquence’ (Hume 1739-40: xiv). In the absence of demonstrable 
truth, persuasion is decisive, as Smith, again, developed more fully in his Lectures on 
Rhetoric. Psychology, then, is not just part of the subject matter of a science of human 
nature, but also determines how science develops in the scientific community.  
 
The Faculties of imagination and reason, however, are not enough to explain behaviour 
(in terms of action or persuasion). It is at the level of sentiments, or passions, virtue and 
vice, that we find the motive for action (or the prevention of action): ‘I shall endeavour to 
prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and 
secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will (Hume 1739-40: 
413). A theory of moral distinctions grounded in the passions was fundamental to 
Hume’s approach to economics, such that behaviour could not be explained by self-
interest alone, but also by the exercise of virtue (or vice) as defined by the moral 
principles embodied in a society’s customs and habits. For Hume, there are ‘natural’ 
virtues which are inherent to human nature, such as generosity and clemency, which 
always attract approval (through sympathy). These virtues are as fundamental to human 
nature as self-interest (implying that they cannot be explained by self-interest). There are 
also ‘artificial’ virtues, such as justice, which evolve as conventions over time through 
social interaction. It is through the historical evolution of the concept and practice of 
justice that Hume saw the emergence of the concepts of property and property rights. 
Thus government has its origins in moral sentiments, and develops a role in 
implementing systems of justice. Government more generally is required to encourage 
moral sentiments where informal social conventions are weakened (as in the emerging 
commercialisation of activity). We turn now to focus specifically on Hume’s thinking on 
economic subjects, as an exercise in moral science. 
  
Hume’s economics in light of his philosophy 
Hume published a long series of Essays, following publication of the Treatise, and some 
of these were devoted explicitly to economic issues. Eugene Rotwein gathered these in a 
volume entitled Hume’s Writings in Economics. His introduction (Rotwein 1955) not 
only elaborates on the economic context in which Hume was writing (summarised in the 
second section above), but also draws attention to key features which carry forward from 
his philosophy: an emphasis both on psychology and on history (ibid.: xvi ff.). By 
exploring Hume’s theory of money and the related theories of trade and development, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
money was a sign of value. This sign was supported by convention and long experience. But Hume feared 
that the same was not true of bank credit money, where the fiction did not necessarily have substance, and 
there was scope for loss of confidence and panic (Caffentzis 2008). 
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which Hume draws on his theory of human nature, we can see the significance of these 
emphases. 
 
In the essay ‘On Money’, Hume set out a monetary theory of the price level which was 
‘rediscovered’ in twentieth-century monetarist theory. For Hume, the general price level 
was the outcome of the ratio of circulating money (ie excluding any money which is 
hoarded) to commodities. Hume drew attention to the constant conjunction of events, 
observed in history, of an inflow of specie and, after a lag, a rise in the general price 
level. Where this inflow was the result of increased exports, the inflation would reduce 
the competitiveness of exports, so that competing nations would be able to regain some 
of their advantage.  
 
But Hume argued that this correlation between money and prices was not a direct causal 
relation; the inflow of specie itself was simply the symptom of an increase in exports. It 
was this increase in economic activity which drove up wages and thus prices, not the 
inflow of money itself. Rather, he drew on his detailed observation of human behaviour 
in a wide variety of societies in order to explore both the psychological implications of an 
increase in trade, and also the role of custom and habit in the outcome.  
 
Accordingly we find, that, in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in 
greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face: labour and 
industry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer 
more diligent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater 
alacrity and attention (Hume 1752: 286) 
 
From the whole of this reasoning we may conclude, that it is of no matter of 
consequence, with regards to the domestic happiness of a state, whether money be 
in a greater or less quantity. The good policy of the magistrate consists only in 
keeping it, if possible, still encreasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive the 
spirit of industry in the nation, and encreases the stock of labour, in which 
consists all real power and riches (ibid.: 288). 
 
These circumstances are contrasted with the experience of nations with a net outflow of 
money: ‘The poverty, and beggary, and sloth, which must ensue, are easily foreseen’ 
(ibid.). But it is not the shortage of money as such which is the problem: 
 
[T]he effect, here supposed to follow from scarcity of money, really arises from 
the manners and customs of the people; and that we mistake, as is too usual, a 
collateral effect for a cause. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires 
some thought and reflection to discover the principles, by which we can reconcile 
reason to experience (ibid.: 290, emphasis in original). 
 
The urging of the magistrate to promote growth by ensuring a rising money stock has 
been the subject of much discussion, as it seems to be at odds with the interpretation of 
Hume as a quantity theorist. However, Wennerlind (2008) draws attention to the fact that 
Hume refers to the ‘magistrate’ (not the private banks whose credit issue caused the 
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money supply to change), ie to the legislator, who had no involvement in the credit 
process. He concludes that what Hume was advocating was that the economic conditions, 
and associated institutions and practices, be promoted which would encourage the kind of 
increase in industry which would lead to a rise in money. 
 
Thus we see that Hume’s monetary theory focused on the response of individuals and 
societies to the changing economic circumstances which happen to be accompanied by 
money flows.  His interest was more in the processes set in train by these circumstances 
(with the effect of changing productivity levels) than the eventual outcome of rising wage 
and price levels (Wennerlind 2008, Caffentzis 2008).  He clearly did not think of money 
as being neutral in the short run (in the sense of correlation between money and output 
and employment); nor could it be seen as necessarily neutral in the long run to the extent 
that productivity changes, albeit offset by changes in export prices, engendered further 
structural change. (He refers for example to an increase in enterprise, which is not a 
short-run phenomenon.) Indeed, Schabas (2008) argues that the modern short-run/long-
run distinction is not appropriate for Hume, in that the changes set in train by initial 
increases in productivity could continue for generations.11 While monetarist theory 
absorbed some of Hume’s theory, therefore, it ignored (particularly in its formalist 
expression and associated econometric estimation) the structural changes, with their 
origins in psychology and changes in habits and customs, on which Hume placed such 
emphasis (Wennerlind 2005).12  
 
The existence of money as a social relation was for Hume an essential element of 
commercial society. Hume paid particular attention to the change in manners and 
customs which accompanied commercialisation, and the associated development of both 
property and money. Like others in the Scottish Enlightenment, he had a particular 
interest in differences between ‘rude’ societies and commercial society.13 Society played 
different roles in economic development. First, social interaction was fundamental to the 
formation and observing of conventions. Second, the imagination served not only to 
encourage moral behaviour, but also to spark envy and the desire to acquire goods being 
enjoyed by others. Indeed, trade introduced new luxury goods to different societies, 
creating new wants previously undreamt of (Hume 1752: 300). The aspiration to acquire 
these goods was a great spur to economic activity. Hume thus argued that trade itself 
would encourage economic activity by expanding the desire for imported goods.  
 
However trade also created the risk that domestic producers would seek to produce 
elsewhere, where labour costs were lower. The first advantage of the exporting country 
would then be eroded, leading to higher rates of growth in the low-wage economy, until 
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 Schabas (2008) similarly argues that Samuelson (1980) was misguided in his criticism of Hume for 
ignoring the law of one price, another solution to modern equilibrium models which might never be 
reached. 
12
 Friedman himself devoted considerable attention to monetary history, see eg Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963). 
13
 It is claimed (see eg Caffentzis 2001) that this interest, and indeed the content of his economic essays, 
reflected a veiled concern with the ‘civilising’ of the Scottish Highlands. This now comes across as 
patronising, but the tenor of explicit discussions of other societies (eg Hume’s friend William Robertson on 
India, see Meek 1976) was of respect for different modes of organisation and behaviour.  
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these wages were driven up such as to eliminate the initial wage differential. For Hume, 
therefore, economic growth was a process of catch-up. There was much debate as to how 
long this process would take, and indeed whether low wage countries would ever erode 
the first-mover’s advantage. But, having seen that satisfying new needs for luxury goods 
was a major spur for trade and thus industry, Hume argued that rich countries needed to  
develop the ‘capacity for flexible specialisation and technological innovation’ in order to 
maintain a competitive advantage (Hont 2008: 313). Hume thus put the emphasis on 
human faculties and sentiments as the key to economic performance, rather than labour-
saving machinery. Indeed, since high wages provide an incentive to industry and thus 
further development of human capabilities, Hume argued for ample remuneration and an 
absence of coercion (Hume 1752: 253-67). 
 
Another factor inhibiting the erosion of first-mover advantage (and thus perpetuating 
growth differentials) was the time necessary for developing conventions and institutions 
suited to this higher level of economic activity, although international trade facilitated 
this process. In particular, as we have seen, Hume was concerned with the major changes 
required by commercialisation itself. Hume (1752) argued that this transformation would 
have economic benefits, but also benefits which were more widely moral, social and 
political (see further Wennerlind 2006). He argued that increased commercial activity 
encouraged social interaction, and expanded experience, combating ignorance and 
discouraging hostility, and promoting the development of, and support for, conventions 
which promoted justice and virtue. Industry and commerce also created the conditions for 
the flourishing of the mechanical and creative arts among what Hume referred to as the 
‘middling sorts’, which encouraged innovation. Hume was here drawing on his 
epistemology, with its emphasis on the limitations of human knowledge, the role of the 
imagination in addressing these limitations, and the basis of knowledge in social 
convention.  
 
While self interest in the form of material gain was a powerful passion behind industry, 
Hume (1739-40: 492) saw its potential for being ‘destructive of society’ if it was not 
tempered by moral conventions, and in particular a system of justice. Material gain itself 
was not independent of morals; its very meaning rested on the concept of property, which 
in turn rested on a moral system. Further, Hume identified the importance of the search 
for happiness, as distinct from material gain or any other hedonistic sense. Thus:  
 
[T]he antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counter-balanced by 
any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness 
of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are the circumstances, 
very requisite to happiness.   
Hume (1748: IX.II.233) 
 
Hume (1752: 270) saw labour itself as a source of happiness: ‘the mind acquires new 
vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both 
satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which 
commonly spring up, when nourished by ease and idleness’. Hume was concerned about 
the risk of social alienation of workers (ibid. 198), rather than the ‘middling types’ who 
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had more chance of happiness through labour, but drew attention to the social benefits 
from paid employment in encouraging personal discipline. However, in expressing 
concern about the social consequences of the search for material gain being given free 
rein, Hume reflected the concerns of other Enlightenment figures, notably Adam 
Ferguson, that the increasing division of labour might lead to social isolation, eroding the 
social conventions on which industry and commerce relied (see McNally 1990). 
Commercialisation thus brought costs as well as benefits; in particular, government was 
required to promote the conventions of justice and virtue, and embed them in institutions. 
 
Overall, however, Hume is generally interpreted as emphasising the benefits of 
commercialisation, with supportive government. For example, Wennerlind (2006: 55) 
summarises Hume’s perspective on the economic process as follows: 
 
[W]hen industry, commerce, and the arts come together and flourish in a mutually 
reinforcing manner, society embarks on a self-sustaining process of economic, 
political, and cultural improvement. A set of incentives is established that propels 
the middling sorts to act in ways that solidify and reinforce the basic institutions 
of a commercial society, resulting in a prosperous economy. 
 
We have seen some of the scope for different interpretations of Hume, for example with 
respect to his monetary theory. But from the very beginning Hume’s philosophy was the 
subject of widely diverging interpretations, which led inn turn to diverging interpretations 
of his economics. We consider some of the range of interpretations in the following 
section. 
 
Interpretation of Hume 
Hume’s philosophy was challenged, even by some of his Scottish contemporaries as 
being destructive of science, in that he argued that neither deductive nor inductive logic 
could demonstrate the truth of arguments (Dow 2002a). It was from these interpreters that 
Kant first learned of Hume (see Kemp Smith 1918, xxviii-xxix), and Kant accepted the 
destructive-sceptic interpretation of Hume, which Kemp Smith traces to the influence on 
Kant of German rationalism.14 This interpretation gained influence from T H Green’s 
Introduction to the 1874 edition of the Treatise, which posited ‘that Hume has no set of 
positive beliefs, and merely develops to a sceptical conclusion the principles which he 
inherits from Locke and Berkeley’. Russell (1961: 634-47) added further authority to this 
interpretation, seeing Hume’s scepticism as leading to a ‘dead end’. Russell’s 
interpretation of Hume in turn influenced Popper’s (1975: 1) view of Hume as having 
encouraged irrationalism through his ‘destruction of empiricism’.  
 
The Austrian logical positivists, however, regarded logical and mathematical knowledge 
as exempt from this interpretation of Hume’s scepticism (see Luthe, 1984). The logical 
positivist project was to construct a system of logic on the basis of empirical testing. 
They took on board the negative rationalist interpretation of Hume, which emphasised his 
scepticism about the truth-value of a priori argument. But they saw positive possibilities 
                                                 
14
 Arguably it was through the mistranslation into German of the English word belief that Kant 
misunderstood Hume’s reliance on belief as a foundation for reason (see Luthe 1984). 
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in his emphasis instead on experience, or empirical evidence. Hume’s argument that all 
knowledge requires support from experience became the logical positivist maxim that 
only testable statements are meaningful, without addressing Hume’s problem of 
induction. 
 
This interpretation of Hume as the father of logical positivism has been perpetuated in 
modern discussion in economic methodology which draws on the philosopher Bhaskar 
(1975). Critical realists for example introduced their project of developing a critique of 
the reliance on econometric evidence by associating the latter with Hume (see Lawson 
1997: 19). Reference is made to what is seen as Hume’s particular version of empiricism, 
which involves associating causation with constant conjunction of events (rather than 
underlying causal mechanisms). This is contrasted with a realist approach to economics, 
which does not require the presumption of known structure (within stochastic variation), 
but rather focuses on causal mechanisms which underlie changing structure – necessarily 
eschewing sole reliance on econometric evidence. In fact there is a longstanding 
literature, both in philosophy and in the history of economic thought, which interprets 
Hume as himself a realist, avoiding the interpretations of him as a nihilist with respect to 
rationalism (in the form of either deductive or inductive logic) or a pure empiricist (see 
for example Wright 1983, Strawson 1989). Rather, Hume is seen as providing a practical 
philosophical foundation for science, which did not aim for (inaccessible) certainty, but 
rather for usefulness as the basis for action. It was this literature which provided the basis 
for the account of Hume’s philosophy offered in the previous section.15 
 
But in modern economics, when Hume’s philosophy of science is referenced, it is the 
pure empiricist interpretation that has been more evident. Although rationalism is a 
powerful force in economics, and there is a strong deductivist pure theory tradition, 
rationalist economists do not tend to address Hume’s argument that knowledge cannot be 
demonstrated to be true on the basis of deductive logic. Indeed Hume’s argument has 
resurface, for example in pure mathematics, where attempts to construct complete 
mathematical systems independent of empirical reality have failed (Weintraub 2002). 
Nevertheless there is a subjectivist strain in modern economics which substitutes 
knowledge held subjectively to be true for knowledge held objectively to be true. This is 
the case for the Subjective Expected Utility approach which allows for a rational basis for 
action without certain knowledge. The Rational Expectations Hypothesis literature turns 
rather to inductive logic by representing subjective knowledge by stochastic empirical 
models where predictive success is the guide for truth (Lawson 1988). This follows in the 
long positivist tradition in economics, whereby theory choice is determined by empirical 
confirmation.  
 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of Hume as being neither pure rational sceptic nor pure 
empiricist does have a strong tradition elsewhere in economics, typically among those 
who have made a detailed study of Hume’s work. Among these economists perhaps the 
most notable are Keynes and Hayek, and it is to their interpretations that we now turn. 
These interpretations are of particular interest because, while they have much in common 
                                                 
15
 Dow (2002b) sets out a critique of the critical realist portrayal of Hume by critical realists as a positivist. 
Criticising Hume now assumes less prominence in critical realism, eg Lawson (2003). 
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in terms of philosophy of science, they yielded different conclusions in terms of 
economic policy. 
 
Keynes was a noted scholar of Hume,16 and, as Meeks (2003) argues, was strongly 
influenced by him. Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, which pre-dated his economics, 
addressed the same question that Hume raised with his problem of induction: how to 
establish reasonable belief in a proposition, as a basis for action, in the absence of certain 
knowledge. When he applied this philosophy in his economics, he echoed Hume in 
arguing that, in the absence of certain knowledge of the future, we have to rely unduly on 
past experience (Keynes 1937). In line with our contrast above between Hume’s 
philosophy and continental rationalism, Keynes explicitly contrasted Hume’s challenge to 
systems of certain knowledge, on the one hand, with Kant’s attempt to reintroduce 
certainty (Keynes 1921: 266; see also 302-3). Keynes’s Treatise is concerned almost 
exclusively with uncertain knowledge, which he argued was the predominant case for 
social systems. Nevertheless  Keynes’s interpretation of Hume is at times somewhat 
Kantian, emphasising the negative sceptical argument at the expense of what Hume 
proposed in place of pure deduction or pure induction:17 ‘Such scepticism goes too far’ 
Keynes (op. cit.: 56) (see further Carabelli 1988: 85-7). He goes on to argue that we are 
not limited to Hume’s ‘lively imaginations’ for judgements of probability: ‘we may 
believe that our judgments can penetrate into the real world, even though their credentials 
are subjective’ (ibid.).18 Probability is a matter of logic rather than mere observation or 
sentiment, and Keynes’s philosophy arguably allows more scope than Hume’s for 
deductive reasoning. O’Donnell (1989: 342) goes so far as to argue that, ‘on probability 
…, Hume and Keynes were poles apart’.  
 
But the logic to which Keynes refers is ‘human logic’ rather than the classical logic of 
rationalism (which requires certainty in the truth-value of premises) (see eg Keynes, 
1972: 338-9). This logic draws on the same interpretation of Newton (Keynes1972: 363-
74; Carabelli 2003) as was employed in the Scottish Enlightenment. Thus, contra 
O’Donnell, Keynes (1921: 468) in fact notes that he would expect Hume to have 
sympathy with his approach to probability. Indeed Keynes’s recourse to considering 
inductive argument in practise is in fact very much in line with the broader interpretation 
of Hume we have offered here, which sees Hume too progressing beyond the argument 
against rationalism, and enquiring into how beliefs are established in practise. Hume’s 
applications to economic questions provide case studies for the methodology implied by 
his philosophy. 
 
For Keynes, action based on reasonable belief, albeit under uncertainty, notably included 
government action. Like Hume, ‘Keynes’s prescription was that the state should act as 
the guardian, supervisor and promoter of civilised society’ (O’Donnell 1989: 299), and 
                                                 
16
 Indeed, along with Piero Sraffa, he reissued Hume’s Abstract in 1938. 
17
 It would not be surprising for Keynes to follow Kant’s interpretation of Hume, even if not Kant’s 
solution to Hume’s scepticism, given the influence on him of the Kantian G E Moore, as well as Russell. 
18
 There has been much discussion of the relation between Keynes’s epistemology and that of Frank 
Ramsay, which is relevant for modern discussions of subjective expected utility theory. That Keynes (1972: 
339) identified Ramsay with Hume may be significant for the interpretation of Keynes’s interpretation of 
Hume as a sceptic. 
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thus ‘protector of individualism and personal freedoms’ (ibid.: 303). Like Hume in his 
approach to Highland Improvement, Keynes advocated that ‘moderation … govern the 
pace of state-induced change’ (ibid.: 306). In the General Theory, Keynes argued 
specifically, in the context of the Depression, that, without government intervention in 
the form of a fiscal stimulus, market forces alone could generate a persistent 
unemployment equilibrium. Keynes was fully aware that the consequences of such action 
could not be predicted with certainty (O’Donnell 1989). Nevertheless the justification lay 
in knowledge held with lower degrees of uncertainty. His Treatise had spelt out a 
pluralist approach to knowledge, whereby, if arguments using different methods and 
different types of evidence supported a proposition, this added weight, and increased 
confidence in the proposition. High degrees of uncertainty, where evidence was lacking 
and/or arguments were contradictory, justified inaction (as in high liquidity preference) 
(Runde 1990, 1994). Keynes’s approach to politics, more generally, was that its essence 
consisted of ‘persuasive appeals to reason’, where persuasion required weight of 
argument (O’Donnell op. cit.: 274). 
 
Hayek (1967: chapters 5 and 7) made much more extensive use of Hume’s work, and 
expanded at length on the contrast with the views of Hume, and other figures of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, with continental rationalism. He drew on Hume both for his 
theory of knowledge, and also for his theory of social organisation. Like Hume, he was 
interested in the science of mind, distinguishing in The Sensory Order between the life of 
the mind and the world of physical objects. There is a limit to the extent to which the 
mind can establish a rational basis for action, and much action is therefore determined by 
habit and convention built up from generations of experience. Hume had argued further 
that, as commercial activity evolves, society develops conventions which curb the self-
interested activities which would otherwise reduce the benefits to be derived from 
commerce. For Hume it was through imagination rather than reason (applied to moral 
sentiments) that conventions become established (Hume 1739-40: 3.2.1-3).  
 
Since for Hayek (1960, 1970-9) social order arose, not through deliberate action, but 
through the unintended consequences of habitual action on the part of individuals, this 
spontaneous order could not be subjected to abstract rational justification or analysis, nor 
could rational argument be sufficient to justify government intervention. Hayek (1967: 
121) recognised that Hume did see a role for government in promoting a sound basis, in 
institutional and physical infrastructure). But Hayek did not see a role for the kind of 
policy activism advocated by Keynes a subject for debate between them. Both shared the 
interpretation of Hume as being critical of the scope for certain knowledge. Hayek 
accepted the limitations of knowledge, based on Hume’s critique, as limiting the scope 
for reason to provide a foundation for policy action. This stance drew further justification 
from the sense he drew from Hume and the other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment 
that commercial society itself developed the conventions which ensured that individual 
behaviour had the unintended consequence of order.19  
 
                                                 
19
 It is significant that Hayek (see eg Hayek 1978 chapter 15) places such an emphasis on Mandeville 
(1732), whose Fable of the Bees was a pioneering argument along these lines, which was highly influential 
in the Scottish Enlightenment. 
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Hayek differed from Hume in privileging subjective knowledge, gained through 
introspection and experience, as being much more reliable than third-party knowledge. It 
was this view of knowledge which particularly inclined Hayek against the notion of 
government action, which would be based on third-party knowledge of experience. Given 
Hume’s emphasis on historical knowledge, he clearly gave an important role to the 
outside observer (Broadie 2003b). Nevertheless, Hayek’s related focus, in the Austrian 
tradition, on the central role of the entrepreneur, his drives and his creativity through 
imagination, hold much in common with Hume’s theory of economic development as a 
process (see eg Hayek 1978).  
 
There remains tremendous scope for debate about this interpretation of Hume, which is 
reflected in the difference of view between Hayek and Keynes as to the extent of order 
which spontaneously emerges in society, and the scope for knowledge beyond individual 
experience, in spite of their common understanding of much else of Hume’s work. Hume 
arguably was less sanguine than others about social order being the assured outcome of 
individual behaviour. For Hume, government has a role where social conventions and 
their observance fall short (Wennerlind 2006: 49-50). This role included intervention in 
order to promote commercialisation itself; a view supported by Hume’s active role in the 
Highland ‘improvement’ movement of the time (Caffentzis 2001). Hume more generally 
saw considerable scope for advice to the legislator. As Wennerlind (2006: 46) puts it:  
 
David Hume wrote about political economy in order to encourage debate about 
the best way to secure virtue and prosperity in a rapidly modernising commercial 
world. From the time of his first publication, A Treatise of Human Nature, in 
which he articulated his thoughts on how a society and its polity should be 
organised to reap the greatest benefits from commerce, he engaged in a lifelong 
effort to advise citizens and legislators on  how to respond to political and 
economic concerns. 
 
But in considering the relevance of Hume’s ideas for the twenty-first century, we need to 
remember that he was writing at an early stage of commercialisation. Smith (1776: 
I.VIII.13, 84) for example forewarned about the tendency for competition to be eroded as 
producers sought to increase their market power, reducing the benefits from market 
activity. How far does Hume’s philosophy provide a justification for belief in 
spontaneous order in the twenty-first century? In the spirit of Hume, our assessment of 
the justification must rest on experience more than reason; for both Hayek and Keynes, 
their own belief systems, drawn on experience and the conventional beliefs they had 
absorbed, determined whether they perceived order or absence of order. 
 
We turn now to consider the relevance of Hume’s thought more generally for economics 
in the twentieth century. 
 
Implications of Hume’s Philosophy for Modern Economics 
The issues raised above regarding the interpretation of Hume by Keynes and Hayek are 
of interest in their own right, but also because current theoretical developments make 
active use of Keynes and Hayek, including their interpretations of Hume. Thus for 
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example modern theory of uncertainty in the Keynesian tradition makes explicit use of 
his epistemology and his understanding of the nature of social systems (see eg Runde and 
Mizuhara, eds, 2003), and applies them to such areas as monetary policy (see eg Dow 
2004). Similarly, Hume and Hayek’s analysis of conventions and social order has 
recently been brought to a discussion of convention in evolutionary game theory by 
Sugden (1989) as a counterpoint to classical rational choice theory, and to discussions of 
economic performance.  
 
In considering Hume’s philosophy more generally, the implications for modern 
economics fall into two broad and inter-related categories. First there is Hume’s 
foundation in a theory of human nature, and the consequent evolution of forms of social 
and economic organisation. Second there is his theory of the nature of human knowledge, 
which has direct application both to human behaviour in the economy and to the 
discipline of economics itself. His theory of knowledge therefore is relevant to how we 
consider applications of his ideas on behaviour and conventions.  
  
There has in recent years been increasing reference in what we might call the ‘new’ 
behavioural economics (Sent 2004) to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The aim has 
been to try to explain experimental behaviour which does not conform to the predictions 
of the conventional rational choice framework. Much of this work has been sparked off 
by psychological experiments (notably in the pioneering work of Khanemann and 
Tversky, eg 1979). Reference is made in this literature to social conventions which 
moderate self-interested behaviour. (Given the close connection between Smith’s ideas 
and those of Hume, this is relevant for our purposes.)  
 
The main issue for rational choice theory is how far following social conventions, and 
indeed the evolution of the conventions themselves, can be explained as the outcome of 
rational choice. We have seen that Hume saw these conventions as an expression of 
moral sentiments alongside self-interest, and indeed he saw self-interest in terms of 
material gain as requiring moral conventions (notably property rights). Rather than 
analysis in terms of rational choice, therefore, analysing such conventions requires 
historical study of the relevant society, its approach to morals and its institutional 
framework. But it is clear that behavioural economics is concerned to proceed along 
rationalist lines. Ashraf, Camerer and Lowenstein (2005) for example present an 
interpretation of Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ as the voice of reason which, in the long-
run, overcomes the short-term, irrational passions. But Hume had explicitly argued that it 
made no sense for reason and passion to be opposed, since reason itself could not 
motivate action. In any case, the consensus interpretation in the Smith literature makes it 
clear that the impartial spectator is the imagined observer of our actions through whom 
we make moral, not rational, judgements.  
 
Moral judgements are inherently relational. Bruni and Sugden (2000) explore the work of 
Hume and Smith, along with their Italian contemporary Genovesi, for ideas on analysing 
a particular relation which is fundamental to market activity: trust. They argue, in 
sympathy with Hume, that social relations can be fostered by the institutions and 
conventions which evolve with commercial society, although they rely on networks 
 17 
which have the capability of collapsing. While Bruni and Sugden interpret Hume as 
emphasising self-interest, they point out the barriers within the modern rational choice 
framework to developing relational theories of behaviour.  
 
These barriers are primarily methodological. It is the rationalist requirement to express 
theory in a deterministic, formalist way that makes relational theory so difficult. The 
‘old’ behavioural approach takes a different methodological approach and is therefore not 
so constrained (egs; see further Dow forthcoming). This approach, which in its neo-
Austrian form owes much to Hayek, explicitly draws on other disciplines, such as 
psychology or management science, to analyse case study evidence. This type of 
evidence is much closer to Hume’s notion of experience than the more abstract 
aggregated data series. It also gets round Hume’s concern that experimental evidence in 
human science was unsatisfactory since he argued that it inevitably distorted behaviour. 
This argument is addressed in the experimental literature where experimental design aims 
to minimise distortion, and efforts are made to understand the nature of distortion which 
cannot be removed (Levitt and List 2007). 
 
Hume’s ideas have also been shown to be relevant to debates within game theory about 
the nature of games. Cubitt and Sugden (2003) highlight the Humean foundations of 
Lewis’s idea of the common knowledge which may be said to underpin experimental 
game playing. Hume’s and Lewis’s work can assist in analysing the nature and origins of 
the conventions which players bring to games. By considering conventions as evolving, 
Cubitt and Sugden (ibid.: 204) offer an alternative to the ‘hyper-rational agents’ of 
classical game theory on the one hand and the ‘blind processes of selection’ of 
evolutionary game theory, with adaptation to deviant behaviour, on the other. 
Conventions cannot therefore be analysed as the outcome of rational choice (see further 
Sugden 1989). Conventions arise and become established through repetition and the 
absence of surprise, rather than moral judgement, though arguably for Hume conventions 
were a guide to moral behaviour for those who chose virtue, but also a guide to 
judgement in the case of those who chose vice.  
 
Similar issues of interpretation of the role of individual rationality have arisen in the field 
of public choice economics, where there has in fact been a move explicitly away from 
referring to historical ideas, such as those of Hume. Marciano (2005) argues that this 
move is founded on a misinterpretation of Hume as seeing all individual behaviour as 
self-interested ‘knavery’, and therefore providing a foundation for rational choice theory. 
Rather, as he puts it, Hume argued that government could only function at all, not only if 
politicians privilege customs but also the virtues of human nature. Without some agreed 
moral principles, there would be no basis for deciding what were good actions by 
government. As a corollary, public choice theory needs to pay explicit attention to the 
conventions of the society in question. Marciano concludes by advocating that, even 
among those who acknowledge Hume as an influence, much more serious attention needs 
to be paid to his ideas. 
 
The role of international differences in social convention is another area where Hume’s 
ideas have relevance to modern economics. Phelps (2006) draws inspiration from an 
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explicitly non-rationalist interpretation of Hume for a study of the role of cultural 
difference in economic performance. In order to understand these cultural differences, 
Hume’s work can be illuminating. But Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006: 46), for 
example, conclude as follows, without reference to Hume, who had addressed these 
questions:  
 
As this research on culture and economic outcomes expands, it raises an exciting 
set of questions. How does culture emerge and how does it persist? What roles are 
played by production technology, political power, efficiency concerns, and even 
factors like hygienic considerations? What determines the persistence of the 
cultural traits? What is the interaction between culture and formal institutions? 
Importing cultural elements will make economic discourse richer, better able to 
capture the nuances of the real world, and ultimately more useful. 
 
Understanding human behaviour at the micro level, if going beyond the rationalist 
approach, requires reference to psychology. Following Hume, we would be concerned to 
understand further the sentiments which motivate behaviour. The happiness literature for 
example is exploring the significance of motivation other than mere avidity, for example. 
Meanwhile the capabilities approach is moving the analysis in a Humean direction, away 
from a hedonistic notion of happiness towards such notions as self-fulfilment and dignity. 
Further we would want to understand better the role of human faculties other than reason 
(in the sense of classical logic) in the context of uncertainty. Thus, for example, 
psychology is brought to analysis of financial market behaviour in the form of the 
‘emotional finance’ approach. As is already evident in behavioural economics, the field 
of psychology has much to offer.  
 
Understanding social behaviour, including the nature and role of conventions and 
institutions, requires reference to sociology. Here too a literature is building up in 
economic sociology which no longer sees market activity as the sole preserve of 
economics, but rather enquires into the social nature of markets (see eg Biggart and 
Beamish 2003). There is also a large literature in economics (institutional economics) 
which focuses on the nature and role of custom, habits, conventions and institutions more 
generally, drawing on economic sociology.  
 
But incorporating other disciplinary knowledge into economics is not straightforward. In 
particular, the requirements of conventional mainstream economics for mathematical 
modelling as a complete account of theory (Goodwin 2000, Colander 2000) are a major 
factor determining how this input can be expressed.20 Thus for example rational choice 
theory cannot incorporate other motives or faculties than rational optimisation with 
respect to fully-specified goals. Evolutionary game theory has been unable to formalise 
the conventions which underpin behaviour. The source and character of entrepreneurship 
is notoriously difficult to analyse formally, since it is by its nature non-deterministic. 
New forms of evidence, such as experiments and surveys, and attention to new variables 
such as culture, are encouraging exciting new developments in economics. But there is 
                                                 
20
 Mathematical expression is not neutral with respect to content (Chick and Dow 2001). 
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the potential for a growing divide between theory and empirical work unless 
methodological issues are addressed (Dow 2007). 
 
Here too Hume has much to offer. Hume’s theory of knowledge, as well as his 
economics, predated disciplinary segmentation, so that his work on economic subjects 
provides an exemplar. He argued against a rationalist reliance on pure reason as being 
unworkable, but also against an empiricist reliance only on evidence. Rather he argued 
for detailed historical study of the way in which human nature is manifested in different 
cultural and organisational environments in order to tease out provisional general 
principles, but then continual checking back against experience as these principles are 
applied. Further, human behaviour itself is governed by a similar approach to knowledge, 
in the absence of availability in general of certainty. Keynes and Hayek drew on this 
theory of knowledge in the twentieth century to underpin their economics. There is much 
that we can still learn from Hume in considering the particular challenges of the twenty-
first century. 
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